Two recent decisions by the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court involving public parks on opposite sides of the state highlight the court’s increasingly strict interpretation of Pennsylvania’s Donated or Dedicated Property Act, 53 P.S. Sections 3381-3386 (DDPA), which imposes restrictions on any change in the use of property donated or dedicated to a political subdivision for a particular purpose.

In In re Blythedale Park, No. 332 CD 2020, 2025 WL 1584149 (Pa. Cmwlth. June 5, 2025), the Commonwealth Court reversed the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas’ decision approving a temporary easement for the construction of a water pumping station in Blythedale Park, a 20-acre public park in Allegheny County. In In re FDR Park, __ A.3d __, 2025 WL 2325411 (Pa. Cmwlth. Aug. 13, 2025), the court reversed the dismissal of a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief filed by a group of residents opposing a renovation project in FDR Park in Philadelphia. Despite their procedural differences, both cases illustrate the exacting requirements of this relatively obscure statute.

The DDPA 

Enacted in 1959, the DDPA provides that land “donated to a political subdivision for use as a public facility or dedicated to the public use or offered for dedication for such use … is deemed to be held by the political subdivision as a trustee for the benefit of the public with full legal title in the political subdivision as trustee.” See 53 P.S. Section 3382. The statute directs that “all such lands and buildings held by a political subdivision, as trustee, shall be used for the purpose or purposes for which they were originally dedicated or donated, except insofar as modified by court order pursuant to this act.” 53 P.S. Section 3383.

Under the DDPA, when, in the opinion of the political subdivision, “the continuation of the original use of the particular property held in trust as a public facility is no longer practicable or possible and has ceased to serve the public interest,” the political subdivision “may apply to the orphans' court of the county in which it is located for appropriate relief,” which includes substituting other land or property of equal size and value or selling the property and applying the proceeds to carrying out the original purpose. Despite the statute’s deference to the political subdivision in determining whether a given use is no longer practicable or possible, the DDPA “does not vest controlling discretion in the political subdivision,” but rather, with the orphans’ court. See In re Erie Golf Course, 992 A.2d 75, 87 (Pa. 2010).

'In re Blythedale Park'

The litigation involving Blythedale Park began more than six years ago, following Elizabeth Township’s grant of an easement to allow Olympus Energy temporary use of a .037-acre portion of the park to construct a water pumping station and an underground water line to provide fresh water to Olympus' nearby gas wells. In June 2019, Elizabeth Township petitioned the Orphans’ Court Division of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas for approval of the easement agreement pursuant to the DDPA. Protect Elizabeth Township, a group of local residents, opposed the petition.

Following an evidentiary hearing, the court granted the township’s petition, finding that the disputed area was no longer practical for use as a park due to its location in a heavily wooded, floodplain area; the disputed area was the only suitable location in the township for the proposed pumping station; and Olympus provided the township with replacement land of equal size and value, which served the public interest.

Protect Elizabeth Township appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the record did not support a finding that it was no longer possible to use the disputed land for its intended park and recreational purpose. A panel of the Commonwealth Court agreed and reversed, holding that the orphans’ court “failed to appreciate that the existence of natural unimproved land is itself a recreational use.” The majority further held that the small scope of the project was irrelevant, writing that “the size of the area used is not the critical factor. It is the nature of the use that governs.”

In a dissenting opinion, Judge Bonnie Leadbetter wrote that while she agreed with the majority’s analysis, the proposed easement was “so de minimis and so beneficial that it seems absurd to block it.” Leadbetter further noted that the proposed pumping station would not interfere with the recreational use identified by the majority.

'In re FDR Park'

At issue in In re FDR Park is the city of Philadelphia’s multiyear renovation of FDR Park, a 384-acre public park located along the Delaware River. The renovation project includes plans to construct artificial turf athletic fields, basketball courts, and two parking lots within FDR Park’s existing footprint and to raise that area of the park by eight feet to install water tanks under the turf to capture stormwater runoff.

In March 2024, a group of residents who live near FDR Park filed a complaint in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, Orphans’ Court Division, seeking, inter alia, injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that the city violated the DDPA because it did not obtain orphans’ court approval for the proposed alterations to the park. The city filed preliminary objections, which the orphans’ court sustained, reasoning that the DDPA was not triggered because it was undisputed that the property at issue would not be diverted from its original public purpose (i.e., it would remain a public park). The residents appealed the dismissal of their complaint and the subsequent denial of their request for a stay of all city activity at FDR Park to the Commonwealth Court.

On appeal, a panel of the Commonwealth Court reversed. The panel explained that while the orphans’ court dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, its rationale for dismissing the DDPA claim was actually that the residents’ complaint did not state a claim, because “orphans’ court divisions are vested with broad residual and discretionary jurisdiction over all matters that are subject to resolution by courts of common pleas generally.” As to the merits of the complaint, the court held that the residents stated a viable claim and “the fact that FDR Park will serve some kind of public purpose does not exempt the new public purpose from review under the DDPA.” The court remanded the matter to the orphans’ court for an evidentiary hearing.

Conclusion 

Pennsylvania courts historically have construed the DDPA very strictly, and these two decisions are no exception. Blythedale Park and FDR Park illustrate that, regardless of the impact of the new proposed use or the degree of deviation from the original public purpose, the DDPA likely will be implicated and present a significant obstacle to any change in the use of public land or property. These cases serve as an important reminder to any municipality, utility, or private entity involved in developments on or near public property to be cognizant of the DDPA’s restrictions.

Reprinted with permission from The Legal Intelligencer, © ALM Media Properties LLC. All rights reserved.