Agencies are not required to analyze every conceivable environmental effect, including those effects from projects “separate in time or place.”

On May 29, 2025, the Supreme Court of the United States published a significant decision in Seven County Infrastructure Coalition, et al. v. Eagle County, Colorado, et al., which narrowly interprets the scope of environmental review required under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and emphasizes the limited role courts play in reviewing agency decision-making under NEPA. More broadly, Seven County signals a trend toward curtailing legal hurdles for infrastructure projects and further clarifying the application of the Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which overturned Chevron deference.

Seven County concerned the U.S. Surface Transportation Board’s (STB) review of an application for construction of an 88-mile railroad line in Utah facilitating the transportation of crude oil to refineries along the Gulf Coast. As required by NEPA, the STB’s project review included the preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS) that addressed the significant environmental impacts of the project and identified feasible alternatives to mitigate those impacts. Ultimately, the STB approved the project, finding that the economic benefits outweighed the environmental impacts identified in the EIS.

Following approval of the project, a Colorado county and various environmental agencies filed petitions in the D.C. Circuit challenging the approval. The D.C. Circuit found for the petitioners and held that the EIS contained numerous NEPA violations and that the STB had not analyzed in sufficient detail the environmental effects of upstream oil drilling and downstream oil refining. Based on those deficiencies, the circuit court vacated the EIS and the STB’s final approval order. The project applicant, Seven County Infrastructure Coalition, appealed the decision of the D.C. Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument on December 10, 2024.

In a unanimous ruling on the judgment, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the D.C. Circuit, holding: (i) NEPA is a “purely procedural statute” that requires courts to show substantial deference to agency decisions; and (ii) agencies need only consider environmental effects that are directly and proximately caused by the project and fall within the agency’s regulatory jurisdiction. Agencies are not required to analyze every conceivable environmental effect, including those effects from projects “separate in time or place.”

NEPA and Permitting Reform

The Supreme Court stressed that NEPA was not intended to serve as a tool for halting development through overextended analysis and was critical of any excessively voluminous EIS as being inconsistent with the text and intent of NEPA.[1] Instead, the Court posited that NEPA should function as a practical “cross-check,” not a substantive hurdle.

The Seven County decision clarifies several core principles:

• Agencies may limit NEPA review to the specific action they are evaluating, without needing to account for remote, downstream or speculative effects.
• Environmental impacts must be causally linked and within the agency’s regulatory authority to warrant inclusion in the EIS.

• Courts should afford substantial deference to agencies’ discretionary decisions regarding where to draw the line when considering indirect environmental impacts.
• An EIS should be concise, project-specific and avoid analyzing environmental effects beyond the agency’s statutory authority.
• Remote and indirect effects are not necessarily subject to NEPA if they are not proximately caused by the project.

Importantly, while the ruling narrows the scope of NEPA, it does not override obligations under other environmental statutes, such as the Endangered Species Act or the National Historic Preservation Act, which continue to impose substantive environmental protections. Moreover, state-level environmental laws and other civil causes of action may provide alternative avenues for challenging infrastructure projects.

Finally, Seven County further highlights the boundaries of the Court’s decision in Loper Bright. Agency discretion is afforded substantial judicial deference when, as with NEPA, such discretion is granted by statute. This differs from questions of law, including the interpretation of a statute, which require independent review by a court. Judicial review of an agency’s interpretation of a statute remains de novo.

In the post-Loper Bright era, the Seven County decision restores a more text-based and practical interpretation of NEPA, giving agencies greater discretion to conduct focused reviews while balancing environmental protection with infrastructure development. Promoting timely and effective permitting appears to be the trend in cases reviewing agency decisions—a boon for a wide array of modern projects, including railways and clean energy facilities.

For More Information

If you have any questions about this Alert, please contact Lindsay Ann Brown, David Amerikaner, Louis C. Formisano, Matthew L. Capone, any of the attorneys in our Environmental Group or the attorney in the firm with whom you are regularly in contact.

Notes

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