In its decision, the panel concluded that the venue selection provision overrides the procedural rules permitting venue in additional jurisdictions based on basic contract principles.
A Pennsylvania appellate panel decided on July 30, 2025, that a contractual choice-of-venue provision signed by a patient is valid and enforceable, affirming the trial court’s transfer of the medical malpractice suit from Philadelphia to Bucks County.
Background
Philadelphia has become a hub for medical malpractice claims. Plaintiffs choose to litigate actions in Philadelphia because of its reputation for large verdicts and perception as being friendly to plaintiffs. The ability to file medical malpractice suits in Philadelphia was expanded in 2023, when a significant procedural change provided plaintiffs with more options on where to file medical malpractice lawsuits.
Twenty years earlier, the Pennsylvania Legislature passed the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act (MCARE). Under MCARE, plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases were restricted to filing their cases only in the county where the alleged medical negligence occurred. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1006(a.1) specifically stated: “a medical professional liability action may be brought against a healthcare provider for a medical professional liability claim only in a county in which the cause of action arose.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1006(a.1). This provision eliminated “forum shopping” for medical malpractice claims.
However, in August 2022, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court eliminated this rule. Effective January 2023, plaintiffs could bring medical malpractice cases in any county in which (1) the defendant can be served, (2) the medical malpractice occurred, or (3) a relevant transaction or event giving rise to the action occurred. This change made the venue rules applicable to medical malpractice cases the same as all other civil cases, in turn making venue in Philadelphia more accessible for medical malpractice plaintiffs.
Somerlot v. Jung et. al.
Now, an appellate panel from the Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld the legitimacy of a choice-of-venue provision clause seeking to limit suit in Philadelphia in a medical malpractice case in Somerlot v. Jung, 2025 Pa. Super 166. In its decision, the panel concluded that the venue selection provision overrides the procedural rules permitting venue in additional jurisdictions based on basic contract principles.
In the case, plaintiff Saramari Somerlot alleged that Dr. Soon Jung and Pain Management Centers of America caused Somerlot's below-the-chest paralysis by negligently performing outpatient surgery to implant a device in her spine. Somerlot and her husband filed suit in Philadelphia asserting claims for medical negligence, corporate negligence, product liability and loss of consortium. Following responses to the complaint, the trial court transferred the case to Bucks County based on the venue provision in the pre-surgery agreement Somerlot had signed, which mandated that all claims stemming from the surgery be brought in the courts of Bucks County.
The plaintiffs then appealed, arguing that Somerlot was excused from the venue-selection clause because Rule 1006(c) allows a plaintiff to bring a lawsuit against all jointly and severally liable defendants in any venue where venue is valid as to any single defendant.
The panel determined that the contractual provision superseded Rule 1006(c) and upheld the trial court’s decision to transfer the case to Bucks County. The panel noted that Rule 1006(c) “only creates the possibility of venue in certain counties” and that “[i]t does not require that the action be litigated there.” Somerlot, 2025 Pa. Super 166 at p. 10. Indeed, Pennsylvania law has long held that parties may freely contract to limit venue.
The panel also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the venue provision is unenforceable. They reasoned that the provision was clear and unambiguous, and there was no effort to reject this provision. If Somerlot did not want the venue-selection clause included, she could have simply crossed it out.
Further, the panel rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the venue-provision was unenforceable under Central Contracting Co. v. C.E. Youngdahls & Co, 209 A.2d 810 (Pa. 1965). In Central Contracting, a venue-selection clause was determined to be “unreasonable only where its enforcement would, under all circumstances existing at the time of litigation, seriously impair [the] plaintiff’s ability to pursue [the] cause of action.” Id. at 816. In Somerlot, by contrast, the panel determined there was no evidence that transferring venue to Bucks County—which was closer to their residence—would impair the plaintiffs’ ability to pursue their action.
Finally, the panel found that the venue-selection clause was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable. Somerlot was free to respond by striking the venue-selection clause, or to walk away from the out-patient surgery—undermining any argument that she lacked any meaningful choice in the matter to rise to the level of unconscionability. Accordingly, the transfer to Bucks County based on the pre-operative agreement was upheld.
Impact of Decision
Plaintiffs have increasingly seen Philadelphia as a desirable venue for filing medical malpractice cases due to the increased potential for significant verdicts. The Somerlot case indicates that for medical providers who operate outside of Philadelphia, venue provisions may provide effective means for limiting the potential for suit in Philadelphia even in light of the more expansive venue provision currently applicable to medical malpractice cases. Providers should consider this option in drafting their consent forms and patient agreements.
For More Information
If you have any questions about this Alert, please contact Sharon L. Caffrey, Robert M. Palumbos, Anne A. Gruner, any of the attorneys in our Trial Practice Group, any of the attorneys in our Healthcare Industry Litigation Group or the attorney in the firm with whom you are regularly in contact.
Disclaimer: This Alert has been prepared and published for informational purposes only and is not offered, nor should be construed, as legal advice. For more information, please see the firm's full disclaimer.