The current Court concluded that Humphrey’s Executor was based on an artificially narrow and “almost fictional” description of the FTC as exercising no executive power.

On June 29, 2026, in Trump v. Slaughter, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the president may fire Federal Trade Commission (FTC) commissioners at will, ruling that the statutory “for-cause” removal protections for commissioners are unconstitutional. In doing so, the Court expressly overruled its 1935 decision Humphrey’s Executor v. United States and confirmed that principal officers who exercise executive power must be removable by the president at will.

Key Takeaways

• The statutory removal protections for FTC commissioners—that they could be fired only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office”—are gone.
• The Court confirms a broad constitutional rule that principal officers exercising executive power must be removable by the president at will.
• Going forward, the FTC will be less independent of the president, and its decisions can be expected to more directly reflect the president’s policy priorities.

Background

The FTC enforces antitrust and consumer protection laws and has the authority to promulgate substantive rules, investigate companies, conduct in‑house adjudications and bring civil enforcement actions in federal court. The agency is led by five commissioners, serving staggered seven‑year terms. Congress declared that they could be removed by the president only “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” (15 U.S.C. § 41).

At the outset of his second term in January 2025, President Donald Trump designated a new FTC chair and, shortly thereafter, removed the two remaining Democratic appointees to the commission, Rebecca Slaughter and Alvaro Bedoya. He did not assert any statutory cause; instead, he informed them that their continued service was “inconsistent with [his] Administration’s priorities” and that they were removed “pursuant to [his] authority under Article II of the Constitution.”

Slaughter sued the president and other executive officials, alleging that her removal was illegal, violated the Administrative Procedure Act and was unconstitutional because the Court’s Humphrey’s Executor decision—invalidating the at-will removal of an FTC commissioner by President Franklin Roosevelt—controlled. The district court granted summary judgment in her favor, held the removal unlawful and enjoined interference with her ability to perform her duties. A divided D.C. Circuit panel declined to stay that order; the Supreme Court stayed it, granted certiorari before judgment and reversed.

The Court’s Opinion

Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the Court, framed the question as whether Congress may insulate principal officers who exercise executive power from presidential removal except for statutory cause. The Court held it may not, concluding that the FTC’s for‑cause removal provision “is contrary to the separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution.”

Humphrey’s Executor upheld for‑cause protections for FTC commissioners on the ground that the FTC’s functions were “predominantly quasi‑judicial and quasi‑legislative” and that the FTC exercised “no part of the executive power.” Thus, the Court concluded, Congress could restrict presidential removal of FTC commissioners.

The current Court concluded that Humphrey’s Executor was based on an artificially narrow and “almost fictional” description of the FTC as exercising no executive power. The Court held that the FTC’s current structure squarely implicates executive power, in the following ways:

• Rulemaking: The FTC promulgates substantive rules with the force of law in a wide range of areas, including “unfair or deceptive” acts or practices, premerger notification obligations, children’s online privacy and manipulative practices in gasoline markets.
• Investigations and in‑house adjudications: The FTC investigates businesses, compels production of information and conducts administrative adjudications in which it can unilaterally issue final decisions and impose compliance obligations backed by monetary penalties.
• Civil enforcement: The FTC brings civil actions on behalf of the United States in federal court, seeking injunctions, civil penalties and consumer redress, often securing judgments in the hundreds of millions or billions of dollars.

The Court characterized these as “the very essence of ‘execution’ of the law” and held that, because the FTC “unquestionably exercises executive power,” its commissioners must be subject to at‑will removal by the president. Accordingly, the statutory “for cause” limitation in 15 U.S.C. § 41 is unconstitutional.

Notably, alongside its announcement of this categorical rule, the Court concurrently carved out an exception for the Federal Reserve, whose “distinct historical tradition of central bank independence” placed it outside the reach of the new at-will removal rule. The Court addressed this carveout in detail in a companion decision, Trump v. Cook (also announced on June 29, 2026), in which it upheld for-cause removal protections for Federal Reserve governors and denied the government’s application to stay an injunction preventing the removal of Governor Lisa Cook.

Conclusion

The Court’s decision in Slaughter is unlikely to have much effect in the short term, as the current FTC has just two commissioners—Chair Andrew Ferguson and Mark Meador—whose decisions generally reflect President Trump’s policy priorities. However, the decision will have long-term consequences for the FTC and other agencies exercising executive functions (other than the Federal Reserve under Cook). With no constraints on the president’s ability to remove commissioners, the FTC will be less independent of the president and will more directly reflect the president’s policy preferences.

For More Information

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